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People’s impression of their own “sense-of-direction” (SOD) is related to their ability to effectively find their way
through environments, such as neighborhoods and cities, but is also related to the speed and accuracy with which
they learn new environments. In the current literature, it is unclear whether the cognitive skills underlying SOD
require intentional cognitive effort to produce accurate knowledge of a new environment. The cognitive skills
underlying SOD could exert their influence automatically—without conscious intention—or they might need to be
intentionally and effortfully applied. Determining the intentionality of acquiring environmental spatial knowledge
would shed light on whether individuals with a poor SOD can be trained to use the skill set of an individual with
good SOD, thereby improving their wayfinding and spatial learning. Therefore, this research investigates the accuracy
of spatial knowledge acquisition during a walk through a previously unfamiliar neighborhood by individuals with
differing levels of self-assessed SOD, as a function of whether their spatial learning was intentional or incidental. After
walking a route through the neighborhood, participants completed landmark, route, and survey knowledge tasks.
SOD was related to the accuracy of acquired spatial knowledge, as has been found previously. However, learning
intentionality did not affect spatial knowledge acquisition, neither as a main effect nor in interaction with SOD. This
research reveals that while the accuracy of spatial knowledge acquired via direct travel through an environment is
validly measured by self-reported SOD, the spatial skills behind a good SOD appear to operate with or without
intentional application.
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Imagine a friend invites you to a restaurant in a neigh-
borhood familiar to your friend, but unfamiliar to you.
During your stroll to the restaurant, you chitchat as you
pass Spanish-style homes with manicured lawns and
wander through a natural park. Upon arriving at the res-
taurant, your friend gets an emergency call and must
leave immediately. Can you find your way home alone?
Your success in returning home likely depends on two
factors: your sense-of-direction (SOD) and your intention
to learn the route along the way. If you have a good SOD
and/or were intentionally noting the layout of the neigh-
borhood, then you might be very successful in returning* Correspondence: heather.burte@tufts.edu
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifhome unaided. In contrast, if you have a poor SOD and/or
were absorbed in the conversation, then you might be
completely unable to return home by yourself. This re-
search aims to answer the question: Is it the case that
people with good environmental spatial skills express that
skill only when they intentionally pay attention to an en-
vironment or does their greater skill express itself without
intentional effort? In this research, participants walked a
route while either gathering impressions of architecture
(incidental learning) or intentionally learning the spatial
layout of an unfamiliar neighborhood. They then com-
pleted spatial tasks—mimicking the restaurant scenario.
SOD, but not learning condition, reliably predicted spatial
knowledge, indicating that the spatial skills associated with
SOD express themselves regardless of one’s intentionality
to learn the spatial layout of a novel environment.is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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The ability to learn spatial properties of novel
environments is an important aspect of our everyday
lives—whether learning a new city you moved to or
navigating through an unfamiliar airport. Spatial know-
ledge acquisition includes learning both metric and non-
metric spatial properties of environments; metric properties
include quantitative distances and directions and non-
metric properties include sequence and connectivity. These
spatial properties include the identities and locations of
landmarks, the turns in a route, and the distances and
directions between places (Goldin & Thorndyke, 1982;
Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). Environments can be
learned directly by people sensing and moving through the
environment or indirectly via symbolic sources of informa-
tion, such as maps or language (Montello & Freundschuh,
1995). And of course, individuals differ in how well and
how easily they learn spatial knowledge about environ-
ments. But an interesting and important question remains:
Do people with good environmental spatial skills express
that skill only when they intentionally pay attention to
spatial properties or does their greater skill express itself
without intentional effort? In this research, we examine
how the individual-difference trait of “sense-of-direction”
(SOD) expresses itself when people directly learn spatial
properties of a new neighborhood. We specifically examine
this relationship as a function of whether people receive
intentional or incidental instructions to learn the spatial
properties.
Directly acquiring spatial knowledge in the environment
Two accounts have been proposed to explain the process of
acquiring spatial knowledge in new environments (micro-
genesis) from direct experience, without symbolic sources:
the “dominant framework” proposed by Siegel and White
(1975) and an “alternative framework” proposed by Mon-
tello (1998). Siegel and White (1975) contended that the
learning of a new environment progressed through three
hierarchical “stages.” First, individuals learn landmarks,
which are salient point-like structures that lack distance and
directional information (i.e., non-spatial identity). At this
stage, landmark knowledge consists of familiarity with the
appearance and perhaps the names of the landmarks, but
no knowledge of how those landmarks are spatially related
(assuming they are out of sight from each other). After
acquiring a sufficient level of landmark knowledge, individ-
uals learn the route(s) that connect the landmarks into a
sequence of movements (non-metric only). For example,
route knowledge might include knowing that landmark A
comes before landmark B along a specific route and that at
landmark A one needs to turn right to get to landmark B.
Finally, after acquiring a sufficient number of routes and
beginning to metrically scale them, individuals relate the
landmarks and routes to one another as part of a metricspatial configuration, referred to as survey knowledge. The
strict hierarchical nature of these stages meant that individ-
uals could not have survey knowledge without first passing
through landmark knowledge and then route knowledge.
With only landmark and route knowledge (at least in its ini-
tial form), a person would not have accurate metric know-
ledge of environmental layout, such as knowledge of direct
distances and directions between landmarks.
In contrast to what Montello (1998) termed the dom-
inant framework, he proposed an alternative framework
in which individuals continuously acquire all three forms
of knowledge from the beginning of a single episode
traveling in an environment, without the need to pass
from one stage to another. For example, most people
have probably experienced walking in an unfamiliar city
for 30 min and knowing more than just the identities of
landmarks they have passed—most would have some
ability to retrace a route back to their starting location.
Many people could probably estimate distances and di-
rections towards at least some of the landmarks they
passed along the route—albeit not very precisely or per-
fectly accurately after only one travel experience. Thus,
it is likely that people acquire some level of route and
survey knowledge after just minutes of exposure to a
new environment and a single travel episode. The alter-
native framework contends that landmark, route, and
survey knowledge are acquired more or less simultan-
eously, as soon as an individual starts experiencing a
new environment. Of course, the accuracy and com-
pleteness of this knowledge increases with experience,
potentially indefinitely.
In the current study, participants were taken on a walk
through an unfamiliar housing development. If the dom-
inant framework accurately describes spatial microgen-
esis, we should not expect any participants to acquire
much metric knowledge about distances and directions;
it is questionable if they would even acquire much infor-
mation about sequences of places along routes. However,
if the alternative framework more accurately describes
spatial microgenesis, we expect that participants will ac-
quire not only route knowledge but some metric survey
knowledge. Only in the latter case should we expect a
substantial relationship between the accuracy with
which participants estimate metric spatial properties
and their SOD.
Individual differences in acquiring spatial knowledge in
the environment
Regardless of which framework describes spatial know-
ledge acquisition better, one would not expect all indi-
viduals to acquire knowledge at the same speed, with the
same accuracy, and so on, even if they had similar levels
of experience in the environment. While this is an active
research topic (Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010), we presume
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some combination of innate or learned spatial abilities
and/or acquired strategies for learning and estimating
spatial properties. In fact, Ishikawa and Montello (2006)
found that individuals, who were driven along a novel
route once a week for ten weeks, showed radically differ-
ent patterns of spatial knowledge acquisition. These differ-
ences were particularly salient in their survey knowledge;
even though some participants did not acquire accurate
survey knowledge after ten trips, these participants did
learn the identities of landmarks, the order of landmarks
along two test routes, and distances between landmarks
along the routes. In essence, even though that study was
designed to compare the dominant and alternative frame-
works, in the end it showed that individual differences
were so substantial that no single framework was likely
to describe the learning process well for everyone.
Some people’s learning seemed best characterized by
the dominant framework, others by the alternative.
Some did not show much learning at all over the ten
weeks. This finding suggests that we should see consid-
erable variance among our participants in their acquisi-
tion of metric survey knowledge, which in turn implies
ample variance to support sizeable correlations with
self-reported sense-of-direction.
Cognitive effort and intention to learn
There is a long history of research on the role of intention
and effort in learning different kinds of information (Craik
& Lockhart, 1972; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Postman, 1964),
some of which has focused on learning spatial information
(Mandler, Seegmiller, & Day, 1977; Naveh-Benjamin,
1987). Research on the impact of active versus passive
exploration of environments while acquiring spatial
knowledge has been mixed (for a review, see Chrastil
& Warren, 2012). Lindberg and Gärling (1983) found
no differences in survey knowledge after incidental or
intentional learning across three exposures to the environ-
ment. However, all participants showed performance
increases across the three exposures, suggesting that all
participants were attending to the spatial properties of the
environment. More recently, Van Asselen, Fritschy, and
Postma (2006) investigated learning differences within a
building and found that landmark identification and
ordering did not differ between the incidental and
intentional learners. Participants who learned intentionally
were more accurate in retracing the route they learned
and drawing the route on a map. In a similar study
focused on landmark knowledge, landmark identification
again did not differ between learning conditions but land-
mark placement on a map showed a benefit of intentional
learning (Wenczel, Hepperle, & von Stülpnagel, 2016),
but another study failed to replicate these findings (Von
Stülpnagel & Steffens, 2013). Overall, these findings suggestthat landmark knowledge and route knowledge might be
relatively effortless to acquire, whereas survey knowledge
might be more effortful. That is, the level of effortful pro-
cessing required to learn the spatial properties of an envir-
onment might depend on the type of spatial knowledge
being acquired. To investigate this possibility, the current
research will assess participants’ landmark, route, and sur-
vey knowledge after incidental or intentional learning of a
novel environment.
A classic method to determine whether a cognitive
process requires automatic versus effortful processing is
to manipulate the intention to learn (Hasher & Zacks,
1979). This is typically done by instructing some partici-
pants to try to learn a certain type of information and
not instructing others. If performance is more accurate
after intentional than incidental instructions, one can
conclude that processing the information requires con-
scious attention and explicit processing. In contrast, if
there are no performance differences whether learning
was intentional or incidental, then one can conclude that
the cognitive process must be automatic. In the current
research, we apply this logic to investigate the interplay
between spatial learning intentionality and individual dif-
ferences in acquiring environmental spatial knowledge
from direct experience. Importantly, we will contrast
intentional with incidental learning of spatial aspects of
the environment (e.g., landmark, route, and survey
knowledge) but will not contrast intentional with inci-
dental attention to the environment per se. This was
done to mimic the restaurant scenario (see the Signifi-
cance statement) in which an individual is looking
around and attending to the environment but not at-
tending to the spatial properties of the environment
(e.g., incidental spatial learning). We will accomplish this
by instructing all participants to attend to the environ-
ment (using a cover story about attitudes toward archi-
tectural and natural features) but instructing only half of
the participants that they must learn the spatial layout of
the environment and will be tested on it (i.e., intentional
spatial learning). By manipulating intentionality in this
way, we ensure that all participants are attending to the
environment but the groups differ in their intentionality
to learn spatial properties.
Sense-of-direction (SOD)
Ishikawa and Montello (2006) reported that the accuracy
and speed with which survey knowledge was acquired by
participants were strongly related to their self-reported
SOD. SOD is the hypothesized ability to find your way
within environmental-scale spaces. It has primarily been
assessed by self-report measures, such as by answering the
simple question “How good is your sense-of-direction?”
(Kozlowski & Bryant, 1977) or by averaging responses to
several questions, such as questions about getting lost,
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ing cardinal directions. Using the multi-item self-report
survey known as the Santa Barbara Sense-of-Direction
(SBSOD) scale (Hegarty, Richardson, Montello, Lovelace,
& Subbiah, 2002), Ishikawa and Montello found that
SBSOD scores related mostly to how well participants
learned survey relations, such as straight-line directions
between landmarks on their test routes. Those who re-
ported having a good SOD learned survey knowledge sub-
stantially more accurately and quickly; those who reported
having a poor SOD learned them less accurately and
quickly, in some cases, virtually failed to learn them at all.
In contrast, participants differed very little in their ability
to acquire landmark and route knowledge as a function
of their SBSOD score; all individuals—regardless of
their reported SOD—were able to accurately order
named landmarks after one exposure to the route. In
fact, most participants were able to accurately estimate
distances between landmarks along the route after only
one trip, even if they reported a poor SOD. In the current
study, we assessed several types of spatial knowledge
and related participants’ performance to their self-
reported SOD.
Previous research has rarely examined different types
of spatial knowledge when examining individual differ-
ences in environmental spatial knowledge (e.g., Fields &
Shelton, 2006; Hegarty, Montello, Richardson, Ishikawa, &
Lovelace, 2006; Montello & Pick, 1993; Schinazi, Nardi,
Newcombe, Shipley, & Epstein, 2013), but when multiple
measures of spatial knowledge have been related to self-
reported SOD, some measures of spatial knowledge relate
to SOD and others do not. In the Ishikawa and Montello
study, participants easily acquired accurate knowledge of
landmark identities and routes, including metric distances
along the routes, and these measures were not related to
SOD. For their measure of landmark knowledge, Ishikawa
and Montello used four landmarks per route (a total of
eight for two routes) and they taught participants verbal
labels for the landmarks. Naming landmarks could have
introduced verbal processing into the processing of spatial
information, which might have drawn upon cognitive
skills that individuals with poor SOD are not particularly
poor at. Support for this idea comes from dual-task para-
digms in which verbal tasks interfere with aspects of
landmark, route, and survey knowledge (Labate, Pazzaglia,
& Hegarty, 2014; Saucier, Bowman, & Elias, 2003; Wen,
Ishikawa, & Sato, 2011). In order to address this issue,
the current experiment used eight landmarks along a
route and the experimenter did not associate the land-
mark with verbal labels. Instead, the experimenter re-
ferred to the landmark scenes by using photographs of
each landmark when testing participants’ spatial
knowledge. This ensured that while participants may
have associated the landmarks with verbal labels, thoseverbal labels were unique to each participant and not in-
fluenced by any verbal label given by the experimenter.
Interaction between cognitive effort and SOD
The main purpose of the current study is to investigate
whether SOD relates to the acquisition of environmental
spatial knowledge differently as a function of learning
intentionality. This is important because it addresses the
question of whether the skills associated with having a
good SOD are better characterized as mental abilities
(such as memory capacity or mental processing speed)
or as strategies (such as paying attention to turns you
take or watching the sun as you walk). Mental abilities
would typically express themselves implicitly whether a
person attempts to apply them or not—they do not re-
quire conscious effort to influence knowledge process-
ing. Strategies, on the other hand, can be consciously
retrieved by a spatial thinker and accurately described to
another person (such as to a researcher during a proto-
col analysis). Even as a strategy becomes easier to apply
with repeated use, people choose to use it when they are
trying to solve a particular problem for which they think
it is relevant. Note that the distinction here between
implicit and explicit does not map perfectly onto the
learned-innate distinction. Strategies are presumably
learned, but mental abilities may be innate, learned, or
(most likely) result from an interaction of innate and
learning influences.
The question of how SOD skills relate to learning ef-
fort and automaticity is not only theoretically important
but is also relevant to the prospect of training people to
have a better SOD. If SOD skills are due to explicitly ap-
plied strategies for spatial problem-solving, then it will
likely be easier and more straightforward to train indi-
viduals for better skill (e.g., Hegarty, Keehner, Cohen,
Montello, & Lippa, 2007; Thorndyke & Stasz, 1980). It
may still be possible to improve mental abilities expressed
without conscious application, however, given appropriate
training experiences (cf. Uttal et al., 2013). This may be
true even for innate abilities; innate does not mean un-
changeable, although it would typically mean less easily
changeable. We expect that training mental abilities would
be considerably less straightforward than simply telling
people to use a specific strategy while solving a problem.
In sum, if SOD reflects learned strategies under con-
scious control, we should find at least a modest main ef-
fect of spatial learning intentionality on spatial knowledge
acquisition, because people with good SOD would learn
better under intentional instructions than incidental (it
is unclear if people with poor SOD could learn the
spatial layout better when intentionally attending to
spatial properties of the environment or not). In par-
ticular, however, we should find an interaction between
learning intentionality and SOD, because individual












N 637 291 42 36
Women 316 156 30 14
Men 318 134 12 22
Unknown 3 1 - -
Experiment location
familiarity
2.9 1.8 2.0 1.9
Mean age 19.3 19.2 18.9 20.0
Age range 17–32 18–28 18–23 18–26
Age standard deviation 1.7 1.6 1.3 2.2
Mean SBSOD 4.8 4.6 3.7 5.9
SBSOD range 1.5–7.0 1.5–7.0 2.1–4.7 5.4–6.9
SBSOD Standard deviation 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.3
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diminished when the spatial layout of an environment
was experienced incidentally, without the intention to
learn it. When people with varying SODs are not told
to pay attention to spatial properties (incidental learn-
ing), they would not be as likely to apply their strategies
and thus would not differ much in the spatial knowledge
they acquire. When the spatial layout of an environment
is experienced intentionally, however, individuals with
good SOD would learn spatial aspects of environments
better because they would better apply particular strat-
egies to learning when told to do so. Therefore, we would
expect that we might find a main effect of learning
intentionality but that we would definitely find an inter-
action between SOD and learning intentionality.
In contrast, if SOD is a reflection of an individual’s
implicit mental ability to acquire spatial knowledge, then
it should not matter whether instructions to learn spatial
properties are intentional or incidental (i.e., learning
intentionality would have no effect). Those with good
SOD would learn more and more accurately whatever
the instructions they receive. It could even be that what
underlies a good SOD is the unprovoked tendency to
attend to spatial properties without being told to do so.
That is, maybe people with a good SOD are always
attending to the spatial properties of an environment,
even when only given incidental instructions. Those with
a poor SOD never or rarely attend to spatial properties,
so even when told to attend to spatial properties, they
do not know how to or they cannot make use of the
spatial properties they notice. Whatever the nature of
the implicit abilities underlying SOD, we would expect
people with good SOD to learn better than those with
poor SOD whether they receive incidental or intentional
instructions. That is, we expect a main effect of SOD, no
main effect of learning intentionality, and no interaction
between SOD and learning intentionality.
In the current research, we investigate how envir-
onmental spatial knowledge that is acquired directly
is related to: (1) SOD; (2) learning intentionality;
and (3) the interaction between SOD and learning
intentionality.
Prescreening Methods
We first screened students from a campus research pool
to identify a group suitable to participate in our main
study. We selected students aged at least 18 years, who
were unfamiliar with the experiment location, and either
relatively good or poor in self-reported SOD.
Participants
Across multiple undergraduate courses, 637 students
(316 women, 318 men, and three unspecified gender)
completed the prescreening questionnaire (Table 1).Enrollment in the courses was over 1000, meaning
that approximately 60% of course students completed
the prescreening.
Materials and procedure
We chose an area near campus known as Storke
Ranch to be the site for our experiment. It is a condo
and single-home neighborhood near the University of
California-Santa Barbara (UCSB) campus. The layout
of the neighborhood is unconventional as a suburban
housing development due to winding streets, a park
area that bisects the neighborhood, and multiple cul-
de-sacs. Storke Ranch is closed off to surrounding
neighborhoods by tall concrete fences and the two-
story homes block most visual access to distant spatial
referents, such as the mountains to the north. Thus,
Storke Ranch provided an adequately complex envir-
onment for learning, with few distant spatial referents,
but was easily accessible from the UCSB campus. Des-
pite its proximity, Storke Ranch was unfamiliar to
most undergraduate students, as it was a new develop-
ment at the time of the study and did not generally
rent to undergraduates.
Potential participants were informed, during lectures
or labs, that there was an opportunity to participate in
research on “attitudes towards architectural and natural
features.” In order to be eligible to participate in the
research, they needed to complete the prescreening
questionnaire and an experimenter would contact them
by email to arrange their participation in the research at
a later date. Potential participants completed the ques-
tionnaire during or after their lecture or lab and
returned the questionnaires to the experimenter.
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graphics (age and gender), the SBSOD scale (Hegarty
et al., 2006), and a familiarity task. The familiarity task
involved a labeled map of the UCSB campus and sur-
rounding neighborhoods, divided into 12 areas labeled
only as “Area A” through “Area L.” Participants rated
their familiarity with each of the 12 areas using a 7-point
rating scale, where 7 was “very familiar” and 1 was “not
at all familiar.” Although we were interested only in
Storke Ranch (labeled “Area B”), we asked about a much
wider set of several areas to avoid tipping off potential
participants to the experimental location. One to two
weeks after completing the prescreening experiment, eli-
gible participants were emailed about participating in
the “attitudes towards architectural and natural features”
research. Participants completed the experiment typic-
ally two to four weeks after being contacted. Participants
were not told how or why they were selected and mul-




We preselected participants for participation in this
study based on their unfamiliarity with the experiment
location (to reduce familiarity effects) and their SOD
scores. Preselection based on SOD scores allowed us to
ensure that participants in the instruction groups had
similar SOD levels and allowed us to compare SOD ex-
tremes. Many studies of SOD and similar continuous
variables rely on median splits. However, this results in
two groups in which very similar participants (those near
the split) are separated into different categories. This
can be especially problematic in skewed distributions,
such as we find with SOD scores (Fig. 1). To reduce this
problem, we opted to split eligible participants into three
groups based on SOD (good, moderate, and poor) andFig. 1 Histogram of SBSOD scores for prescreening participants (aged 18 y
completed the experimentto include only good and poor SOD participants in our
main experiment.
Of the 637 prescreen participants, 635 were aged at
least 18 years. Of these, 416 were suitably unfamiliar
with the experiment location, Storke Ranch (ratings of
1–3 out of 7); their mean familiarity rating was 1.9.
Scores on the SBSOD (M = 4.7; SD = 1.0) were used to
group these students into those with good or poor SOD
(N = 291), who would be eligible for the main experi-
ment, or those with intermediate SOD (N = 125), who
would not be (Fig. 1). A group of 104 students (top 25%)
were classified as good SOD, operationalized as having a
score of 5.5 or greater (M = 5.9). A second group of 187
students (bottom 45%) were classified as poor SOD, op-
erationalized as having a score of 4.7 or lower (M = 3.7).
That left 125 students (middle 30%) with intermediate
scores, who were not eligible for the experiment. These
groups are summarized in Table 1.
A mean SBSOD score as high as 4.7 may seem ra-
ther high for a group to be considered poor on a
self-assessed skill on a 7-point scale. In fact, one nor-
mally finds mean scores above the midpoint of 4.0 in
samples of SBSOD scores (e.g., Montello & Xiao, 2011).
Also, using a stricter cutoff for poor SBSOD left us
with too few of those participants willing to participate
in the experiment. Therefore, we used the slightly
higher cutoff.
Gender effects
Among the 634 prescreening participants who reported
their gender, men reported significantly higher SBSOD
scores (M = 5.1) compared to women (M = 4.5), t(632)
= –7.22, p < 0.001. Of the participants in the main ex-
periment, 71% of the poor SOD participants and 39% of
the good SOD participants were women. This gender
difference in the makeup of the SOD groups is statisti-
cally significant, χ2(1) = 8.35, p < 0.01.ears and unfamiliar with experiment location) and participants who
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Participants
All 291 eligible participants were contacted to participate
in the experiment. Eighty students in total participated
but, due to a typographical error, that included two mod-
erate SOD students. These students were incorrectly la-
beled as having a good SOD, so both were excluded from
analyses. This resulted in 36 good and 42 poor SOD stu-
dents participating in the experiment. These participants
were randomly assigned to a learning condition such that
17 good and 21 poor SOD participants learned
intentionally and 19 good and 21 poor SOD participants
learned incidentally. Those who participated in the experi-
ment were compensated with course credit.
Materials
As described previously, the Storke Ranch neighborhood
provided the site for our experiment (Fig. 2). We de-
signed the 1.28-km route to be walkable within 15 min
and moderately complex, with numerous recognizableFig. 2 Google Map™ of Storke Ranch with the actual route traveled in
and testing locationlandmarks so that route locations could be recognized
from photographs. The start of the route was just outside
Storke Ranch, at the off-campus Santa Catalina dormitory,
where many freshman students resided and were familiar
with (mean familiarity with Santa Catalina was 3.3/7 for
prescreening participants).
Participants were stopped at nine “stop-points” along
the route and asked to attend to the “important area” in
front of them. To avoid the experimenter associating
stop-points with verbal cues that might draw partici-
pants’ attention to a particular feature at the location
(spatial or architectural), the experimenter did not say
anything about the stop-point when stopped at the loca-
tion during the learning phase. When showing the par-
ticipants photographs of views at the stop-points during
the testing phase, the experimenter only used the letter
assigned to each stop-point photograph. Stop-point pho-
tographs were labeled with a letter A–H, which was
randomly assigned so that the letter sequence did not
correspond with the route sequence of stop-points. Thedark gray and stop-points. S start, E example stop-point, F finish
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spective the participant saw while walking the route (i.e.,
direction of travel) and were taken around 10:00–12:00,
so that shadows were minimized (examples of stop-
point photos are shown in Fig. 3). Distances and direc-
tions between stop-points and the testing location at the
end of the route were determined using Global Position-
ing System (GPS).
The testing phase consisted of five tasks: landmark
familiarity rating to assess landmark knowledge, stop-
point ordering and action recall to assess route know-
ledge, and distance and direction estimation to assess sur-
vey knowledge. Participants were also asked three
questions about what they attended to along the route,
how effectively they learned the spatial layout of the
neighborhood (and if not effective, what they would have
changed), and what aspects of a neighborhood are import-
ant to pay attention to in order to become familiar with
and travel efficiently through it. These questions were in-
cluded to look for group differences but participant re-
sponses did not provide much insights due to the brevity
of their responses. We could only confirm that incidental
participants felt that they were ineffective at learning the
spatial layout and would have “paid more attention.”
Stop-point familiarity
Participants viewed stop-point photographs and rated
their familiarity with the location on a 7-point scale,
with “7” indicating they were very familiar with the
stop-point location and “1” indicating that they wereFig. 3 Stop-point photographs when used for the landmark recognition task (
(right). Stop-points were labeled with letters: F is the seventh stop-point and Gnot at all familiar. Subjective familiarity ratings were
used to capture variation in participants’ familiarity
with a location, as opposed to an objective recognition
task that do not capture variation in certainty. This meas-
ure was also used to determine whether or not group dif-
ferences in the other spatial measures might have been
due to differences in familiarity.
Stop-point ordering
All the stop-point photographs were presented simultan-
eously to participants and participants used the letters
associated with each stop-point photograph to indicate
the order they recalled experiencing the stop-point loca-
tions along the route.
Stop-point action recall
Participants viewed stop-point photographs with arrows
superimposed onto them and then indicated which of three
possible actions they recalled taking at each stop-point
(continued on course, turned right, or turned left) (Fig. 3).
Direction estimates
Participants estimated the direction from the testing lo-
cation to the location indicated by a star superimposed
on the stop-point photographs by drawing an arrow in a
circle (Fig. 3); they actually faced 51° west from true
north as they estimated this direction. Relative to the
participant’s heading during test, the range of bearings
to the stop-points was 40° to 284° (i.e., 11° to 127° west
of true north).left), route ordering task (middle), and for distance and direction estimation
is the fourth stop-point
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Straight-line or “as the crow flies” distance estimates were
collected using the psychophysical technique of magnitude
estimation, in which participants are shown a standard unit
of distance and estimate test distances by providing a num-
ber to represent the distance relative to the standard. In our
study, participants estimated the distance from their phys-
ical location to each stop-point location (specifically from
the test location to the location of the superimposed star in
each stop-point photograph). The standard was the per-
ceived distance from their physical location to a fence lo-
cated directly in front of them. The standard was 20 m,
although we did not inform participants of this value. Par-
ticipants were instructed to treat the standard as one unit
of distance and to estimate distances towards the stop-
point locations to the nearest half-standard unit. Actual dis-
tances from the testing location to the stop-points ranged
from 65 m (3.2 units) to 327 m (16.2 units).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the inci-
dental or intentional learning condition. Matching was
used to balance the number of good and poor SOD stu-
dents within each learning condition; however, the experi-
menter was blind to the SOD of the participants during
testing. Participants first completed the learning phase by
walking the route through the environment with the
experimenter; they then completed the testing phase.
Learning phase
The experimenter met participants individually outside
the Santa Catalina dorms to complete research on “atti-
tudes towards architectural and natural features.” Partici-
pants were told they would accompany the experimenter
on a walk through the nearby Storke Ranch neighbor-
hood. Specifically, they were told to “focus on noting the
appearance of the neighborhood, in terms of architecture,
overall design of the neighborhood, and any salient fea-
tures. During the walk, [the experimenter] will stop you at
important areas for you to note the architectural and/or
natural features at that location. After our walk, you will
answer questions about your impressions of the neighbor-
hood.” All participants were given these instructions; thus,
the incidental condition was designed to be incidental
only with respect to learning the spatial layout of the
neighborhood. It was not incidental with respect to paying
attention to the appearance of the architecture, etc.
If the participant was in the intentional learning condi-
tion, the experimenter also told the participant to “focus
on learning the spatial configuration of the neighbor-
hood. You need to learn what is in the neighborhood,
and also how the neighborhood is laid out, which in-
cludes how parts of the neighborhood are connected to
each other. You will be tested on how well you know theroute we walk, as well as the distances and directions be-
tween locations.” Other than this instructional difference,
there were no differences between the two learning condi-
tions. In sum, the learning conditions differed only in the
instructions given to participants about their intentionality
to learn the spatial layout of the environment.
The walk proceeded. At each stop-point, the experi-
menter would stop, state that the location was an “im-
portant location,” pause for 5 s, and continue walking.
This allowed participants enough time to study the stop-
points, so they would be familiar with them during testing.
The experimenter and participant spoke while on the
walk, but the experimenter ensured that the conversations
were light and unrelated to the study. These conversations
would cease when they reached a stop-point. The experi-
menter walked at a quick but relaxed pace; however, the
participant’s own natural walking speed was a factor in
setting the pace. The route took 15–20 min to walk.
Testing phase
At the end of the route, participants were informed that the
research was not focused on architectural and natural fea-
tures, but actually on how people learn new environments.
Participants in the incidental condition were surprised by
this revelation and frequently remarked that did not think
they would perform well on the spatial tasks. All participants
completed the testing tasks in the following order: landmark
familiarity rating, stop-point ordering, action recall, dis-
tance estimation, and direction estimation. All tasks used
the stop-point photographs to refer to places along the
route; they were presented to each participant in the same
order, an order that we determined randomly. None of the
participants in the incidental learning condition informed
the researcher, nor indicated in their answers to questions,
that they knew the experiment was about spatial learning
or was not about attitudes concerning architectural and
natural features. Most of the incidental learners reported
that they were “not effective” in learning the spatial layout
of the environment and would have “paid more attention”
if they had known that they were going to be tested on the
spatial properties of the environment.
Main Experiment Results
Power analysis
Previous studies have consistently found non-significant
learning condition effects (intentional versus incidental
learners) for landmark and route tasks, and have incon-
sistently found significant learning condition effects for
survey tasks (Van Asselen et al., 2006; Von Stülpnagel &
Steffens, 2013; Wenczel et al., 2016). Using the summary
statistics reported in those studies, we calculated effect
sizes for both types of tasks separately. Landmark and
route task effect sizes were in the range of 0.0–0.58 (M =
0.24) while survey task effect sizes were in the range of
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comparison of learning condition, our power to detect
landmark and route task differences was 0.18 and our
power to detect survey task differences was 0.97. This in-
dicates that our study is under powered to detect small
landmark and route task differences (because no signifi-
cant differences have been found in previous studies) but
sufficiently powered to detect large survey task differences
between the two learning conditions.
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
Given that we preselected participants based on their
SOD scores and grouped them by SOD, we modeled
SOD as a discrete variable. We do not want to force a
linear interpolation onto moderate SOD participants
who are not represented within our study. If we modeled
SOD as a continuous variable (which likely characterizes it
accurately as an individual-difference variable), we would
be assuming that performance of moderate SOD partici-
pants falls linearly between the performance of poor and
good SOD participants. Since we do not know this to be
the case, we modeled SOD as a discrete variable.
A 2 SOD group (poor, good) by 2 learning condition
(incidental, intentional) MANOVA with gender (female,
male) was run on the five dependent measures together:
average stop-point familiarity (range of 1–7, with 7 being
“very familiar”), ordinal route error (range of 0–28, with
0 meaning all stop-points were perfectly ordered), cor-
rectly recalled route actions (range of 0–8, with 8 mean-
ing all stop-point actions were recalled correctly),
average absolute directional error (range of 0–180°), and
distance correlation (range of 0–1 with 1 meaning a per-
fect linear relationship existed between the participant’s
distance estimates and the actual distances betweenTable 2 Means and standard deviations for each measure of spatial
Poor SOD Good SOD
Mean SD Mean
Average familiarity 5.1 0.9 6.1
Ordinal route error 3.7 3.5 1.8
Correct route action 6.6 1.1 7.1
Absolute directional error 56° 25° 43°
Distance correlation 0.58 0.45 0.69
Incidental poor SOD Intentional poo
Mean SD Mean
Average familiarity 5.1 0.9 5.2
Ordinal route error 4.6 4.1 2.9
Correct route action 6.7 1.2 6.4
Absolute directional error 61° 30° 51°
Distance correlation 0.55 0.47 0.60stop-points). More details about how each dependent
measure was calculated are provided in the presentation
of univariate analyses below and Table 2 reports the
means and standard deviations for each measure. The
main effect of SOD group was significant, F(5, 69) =
5.67, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26, but the main effect of learning
condition, F(5, 69) = 0.85, p = 0.52, η2 = 0.05, the main
effect of gender, F(5, 69) = 0.72, p = 0.61, η2 = 0.05, and
the interaction of SOD and learning condition were not
significant, F(5, 69) = 0.62, p = 0.69, η2 = 0.04. Across all
dependent measures, differences in SOD resulted in
significantly different knowledge of the spatial layout of
the environment. The intentionality of learning instruc-
tions did not matter and this lack of influence was
equally true for both SOD groups. To explore these re-
sults more closely, we next look at each measure of
spatial learning individually.
Stop-point familiarity
Average self-reported familiarity for the eight stop-points
(range of 1–7, with 7 being “very familiar”) was high at 5.6
(SD = 1.0), indicating that participants generally felt quite
familiar with the stop-points. A 2 SOD group (poor, good)
by 2 learning condition (incidental, intentional) ANOVA
found a significant main effect of SOD group, F(1, 73) =
22.00, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.22. As suggested by Fig. 4, partici-
pants with a good SOD reported greater familiarity with
the stop-points than did participants with a poor SOD.
The main effect of learning condition, F(1,73) = 1.60, p =
0.21, η2 = 0.02, the main effect of gender, F(1,73) = 0.05, p
= 0.83, η2 < 0.01, and the interaction of SOD and learning
condition were not significant, F(1, 73) = 0.33, p = 0.57, η2
< 0.01. This result confirmed that the learning conditions
did not differ in familiarity; therefore, any differencesknowledge
Incidental learning Intentional learning
SD Mean SD Mean SD
0.8 5.5 0.9 5.7 1.0
2.7 3.4 3.5 2.2 3.0
1.1 6.8 1.1 6.8 1.1
20° 54° 26° 46° 20°
0.53 0.62 0.42 0.65 0.56
r SOD Incidental good SOD Intentional good SOD
SD Mean SD Mean SD
0.9 5.9 0.8 6.2 0.7
2.7 2.0 2.2 1.5 3.2
1.0 6.9 1.0 7.3 1.1
19° 46° 19° 42° 21°
0.43 0.68 0.33 0.71 0.65
Fig. 4 Mean familiarity by SOD group and learning condition. Center of the box represents the mean, the top and bottom of the box indicate the
first and third quartile, the whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval, and the circles outside the whiskers represent outliers
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simply differences in familiarity.
Stop-point ordering
We calculated an ordinal route error measure to quan-
tify the error participants made in the stop-point order-
ing task as compared to the actual stop-point order (e.g.,
A then B then C). Every pair of locations (e.g., A and B,
or B and C) was assessed independently in terms of
whether that pair was placed in the correct order re-
spective to how the two locations were encountered
along the route (e.g., for the A-B pair, A came before B
along the route). If a participant’s recalled sequence had
a pair in the right order (e.g., for the A-B pair, A was or-
dered before B), that pair was given a 0. If the partici-
pant recalled a pair in the wrong order, that pair was
given a 1 (e.g., for the A-B pair, A was ordered after B).
Given there were eight locations to recall, there were a
combination of 28 pairs to assess in this way. Thus,
stop-point orders could be scored from 0 to 28; a se-
quence ordered perfectly would receive a score of 0 and
a sequence ordered as poorly as possible would receive a
score of 28.Fig. 5 Ordinal route error by SOD group and learning condition. Center of
the first and third quartile, the whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval,The mean ordinal route error was quite low at 2.8
(SD = 3.3), indicating that on average participants incor-
rectly ordered 3/28 pairs. A 2 SOD group (poor, good)
by 2 learning condition (incidental, intentional) ANOVA
found a significant main effect of SOD group, F(1, 73) =
7.42, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.10. As suggested by Fig. 5, partici-
pants with a good SOD made slightly fewer ordering
errors than did poor SOD participants. The main effect
of learning condition, F(1, 73) = 2.64, p = 0.11, η2 = 0.05,
the main effect of gender, F(1,73) = 0.15, p = 0.70, η2 < 0.01,
and the interaction of SOD and learning condition were
not significant, F(1, 73) = 0.70, p = 0.40, η2 < 0.01.
Stop-point action recall
The number of correctly recalled stop-point actions was
calculated for the eight stop-points (range 0–8, with 8
meaning that all actions were recalled correctly). The
mean correct route actions recalled by participants was
6.8 (SD = 1.1), indicating that participants were very accur-
ate in recalling the actions they took at the stop-points. A
2 SOD group (poor, good) by 2 learning condition (inci-
dental, intentional) ANOVA found a significant main
effect of SOD group, F(1, 73) = 4.77, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.04. Asthe box represents the mean, the top and bottom of the box indicate
and the circles outside the whiskers represent outliers
Burte and Montello Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:18 Page 12 of 17suggested by Fig. 6, participants with a good SOD recalled
stop-point actions more accurately than did poor SOD
participants. The main effect of learning condition, F(1,
73) = 0.05, p = 0.82, η2 < 0.01, the main effect of gender,
F(1,73) = 0.02, p = 0.90, η2 < 0.01, and the interaction of
SOD and learning condition were not significant, F(1, 73)
= 1.17, p = 0.28, η2 < 0.01.
Direction estimates
Mean absolute directional error was 50° (SD = 24°), which
is substantial but still significantly better than chance of
90°, t(77) = –15.01, p < 0.001. A 2 SOD group (poor, good)
by 2 learning condition (incidental, intentional) ANOVA
found a significant main effect of SOD group, F(1, 73) =
76.07, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.10. As suggested by Fig. 7, good
SOD participants pointed to non-visible stop-points more
accurately than did poor SOD participants. The main
effect of learning condition, F(1, 73) = 2.28, p = 0.14, η2 =
0.03, the main effect of gender, F(1,73) = 2.60, p = 0.11, η2
= 0.01, and the interaction of SOD and learning condition
were not significant, F(1, 73) = 0.22, p = 0.64, η2 = 0.02.
Distance estimates
Errors in distance estimation were calculated by correl-
ating each participant’s set of estimated distances with
the set of correct distances. These distance correlations
express relative estimation accuracy across the set of
distances; they are scale-independent, reflecting noth-
ing about absolute overestimation or underestimation
(Montello (1991) argues for the ambiguity of interpret-
ing absolute distance estimation accuracy). Distance
correlations were then converted using the Fisher r-to-z
transformation before analysis. The mean distance cor-
relation was r = 0.63 (SD = 0.49), only moderate but
clearly significantly better than chance of r = 0, t(77) =
12.21, p < 0.001. The main effect of SOD, F(1, 73) =
2.47, p = 0.12, η2 = 0.04, learning condition, F(1, 73) =
0.31, p = 0.58, η2 = 0.01, the main effect of gender,
F(1,73) = 0.03, p = 0.86, η2 < 0.01, and the interaction ofFig. 6 Correct route action by SOD group and learning condition. Center o
the first and third quartile, the whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval,SOD and learning condition were not significant, F(1, 73)
< 0.01, p = 0.99, η2 < 0.01 (Fig. 8).
Discussion
From the beginning of human evolution through the
present time, the ability to learn the spatial layout of novel
environments has been a critical human skill. However,
people vary substantially in how easily and accurately they
acquire spatial knowledge of environments. Their spatial
knowledge acquisition skill relates fairly strongly, both
conceptually and empirically, to an individual-difference
variable known as “sense-of-direction.” We designed the
current experiment to investigate this relationship, specif-
ically if it depends on whether participants learn spatial re-
lationships intentionally or incidentally. Clearly, self-report
SOD predicted spatial knowledge acquisition virtually the
same whether participants learned intentionally or inci-
dentally—the two factors did not interact. Participants
with a good SOD learned more accurate spatial know-
ledge than those reporting a poor SOD for landmark
familiarity, route ordering, route actions, and direction
estimation. In contrast, we found no main effect of learn-
ing intentionality, as participants who were intentionally
instructed to learn spatial relationships did not acquire
more accurate spatial knowledge than participants not
instructed to learn. Presumably, under the incidental in-
structions, few if any participants consciously bothered to
attend to or focus on spatial relationships experienced
during travel.
One tenet of the alternative framework for spatial
learning is that individuals with similar exposure to an
environment will substantially differ in the amount and
accuracy of spatial knowledge they acquire (Montello,
1998), due either to differences in relatively automatic-
ally applied abilities, consciously controlled strategies, or
both. (While the authors of the dominant framework
might have also agreed that individuals will differ in the
accuracy of their spatial knowledge acquisition, their
framework does not mention or imply this.) Thef the box represents the mean, the top and bottom of the box indicate
and the circles outside the whiskers represent outliers
Fig. 7 Absolute directional error by SOD group and learning condition. Center of the box represents the mean, the top and bottom of the box
indicate the first and third quartile, the whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval, and the circles outside the whiskers represent outliers
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strongly support the existence of substantial individual
differences and our present results also reveal large
variance among individuals, variance that correlates at
least moderately with self-reported SOD. We took ad-
vantage of the well-known method of manipulating
learning intentionality (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) to de-
termine whether skill at spatial knowledge acquisition
in the environment involves automatic or effortful pro-
cessing. If variability in how well spatial knowledge is
acquired expresses itself more after intentional than inci-
dental learning, then we can conclude that this skill
requires the conscious application of attention and know-
ledge processing. In contrast, if this variability expresses
itself equally well under either set of instructions, we can
conclude that this skill does not require conscious applica-
tion of attention and knowledge processing.
Our results support the conclusion that the skill
reflected by the construct of SOD does not require con-
scious application of attention and knowledge processing.
Even when participants were misled about the purpose of
the study, by being told to focus on architectural and
natural features of the environment, they performed justFig. 8 Distance correlation by SOD group and learning condition. Center o
the first and third quartile, the whiskers indicate a 95% confidence interval,as well as participants who knew they would be tested on
the spatial configuration of the environment and were told
to pay attention to it. Apparently, differences in spatial
learning skills reflect implicit abilities and are expressed
relatively automatically, without conscious effort. Our
results provide no evidence that SOD reflects effortfully
applied strategies or conscious attention to the spatial
layout of the environment.
This conclusion is reminiscent of Neisser’s (1987)
ideas about a “spatial module” for maintaining orienta-
tion and learning the environment. According to Neisser,
this mind/brain system is specialized for processing
spatial knowledge relevant to the space of locomotion,
i.e., environmental space (Montello, 1993). It is a system
that humans supposedly share with other animal species
that extract spatial layout information from the operation
of perception-action processes, integrating it to form men-
tal representations of the environment, i.e., cognitive maps
(see also Meilinger, 2008; Sholl, 1988; Sholl, Kenny, &
DellaPorta, 2006; Yeap & Jefferies, 1999). Although our
research does not speak to the issue of whether this
system has the classic characteristics of modularity (Cheng
& Newcombe, 2005), it is consistent with Neisser’sf the box represents the mean, the top and bottom of the box indicate
and the circles outside the whiskers represent outliers
Burte and Montello Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:18 Page 14 of 17hypothesis that the system is sensitive to ongoing optical
and proprioceptive information, and operates without
conscious application.
A related possibility is that the implicit abilities that
underlie SOD differences might stem from differing con-
tributions from the components of working memory.
Using dual-task designs, multiple studies have found that
visual and spatial working memory are involved in
spatial knowledge acquisition, the use of spatial know-
ledge, or both. Visuospatial and central executive work-
ing memory were found to be more involved in using,
than developing, mental representations of an environ-
ment (Brunyé & Taylor, 2008). Visual and spatial work-
ing memory (especially the latter) were involved in
encoding of route and survey knowledge (Labate et al.,
2014; Van Doorn & Blokland, 2014), and switching per-
spectives (route or survey) between learning and testing
(Meneghetti, Labate, Pazzaglia, Hamilton, & Gyselinck,
2016). Several studies have examined how differences in
SOD are related to differences in the use of working
memory. For tasks involving route knowledge, individ-
uals with a good SOD relied more heavily on visuo-
spatial than verbal working memory, while those with a
poor SOD relied more heavily on verbal than visuo-
spatial working memory (Baldwin & Reagan, 2009).
Findings by Wen and colleagues extended this work to
include landmark and survey knowledge. Individuals
with a good SOD encoded landmark and route informa-
tion using verbal and spatial working memory (Wen
et al., 2011) and then integrated that egocentric (or
body-centered) survey knowledge into allocentric (or
environment-centered) survey knowledge using all three
components of working memory (Wen, Ishikawa, &
Sato, 2013). In contrast, individuals with a poor SOD
encoded landmark information using verbal working
memory, encoded route information using visual work-
ing memory (Wen et al., 2011), and then are unable to
acquire accurate survey knowledge (Wen et al., 2013).
As these studies indicate, good SOD participants may
have performed better in our tasks, regardless of
intentionality, due to the components of working mem-
ory that were involved in their encoding and processing
of spatial information.
The current experiment apparently failed to fully repli-
cate a previous finding by Van Asselen et al. (2006) of
better spatial knowledge acquisition after intentional
learning compared to incidental learning. Specifically,
neither of us found a difference in landmark recognition
and ordering between incidental and intentional
learners, but van Asselen et al. reported that intentional
learners performed survey spatial tasks more accurately.
In fact, their survey tasks consisted of route-drawing on
a detailed base map, route reversal, and route-distance
estimation, none of which are clearly survey tasks. Butone might still expect from van Asselen et al.’s results
that our survey tasks would reveal the effects of learning
condition (especially since our study was adequately
powered to find van Asselen et al.’s large learning condi-
tion differences in survey tasks). However, there are sev-
eral differences between our methods and theirs. Our
route was outdoors and more than five times the length
of van Asselen et al.’s route; their indoor route had the
normal restricted vistas found in buildings. Also, their
participants performed a 20-min distractor task before
doing the route tasks. But we believe the most telling
difference between our methods was the way we imple-
mented our incidental learning conditions. Van Asselen
et al. told their participants that a scheduling error had
been made; they then walked along the test route osten-
sibly to reach the actual study room. Being led to a des-
tination, without any reason to pay attention to the
environment, their incidental participants could simply
ignore their surrounds as they were walking. That is,
their condition may well have been incidental to all types
of route and environmental information, spatial and
otherwise. In contrast, we did not claim a mistake but
asked our participants to pay attention to the architec-
tural appearance and design of the neighborhood, and
specifically to “salient features.” Our condition was
meant to be incidental to spatial information but not to
the general appearance of the environment, which we
intended as a more precise test of whether performance
differences as a result of self-report SOD depend on
whether people are trying to acquire spatial information
or not. These differences may have contributed to the
non-significant learning condition effects we found in
our survey tasks (as our study was underpowered to detect
small learning condition effects). Replicating our study
with more thoroughly “incidental” procedures would be in-
formative about the role of different types of attentional
focus during environmental learning.
An important caveat of research designs that manipu-
late intention to learn (Chrastil & Warren, 2012, 2013)
concerns the effectiveness of the manipulation. There is
no guarantee that some or all of the incidental partici-
pants actually did ignore spatial information, nor that
some or all of the intentional participants actually did
attend to it. This caveat poses an important potential
threat to the validity of our conclusions. It may be that
SOD relates to one’s “natural” tendency to think about
spatial properties, even when no one has told you to do
so and there is no apparent need to do so (e.g., when
you know a researcher will lead you back). This is con-
sistent with the possibility that participants in the
current experiment with a good SOD attended to spatial
properties even in the incidental condition. But this
caveat only poses a full threat to the validity of our con-
clusions if it is also true that people with a poor SOD
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properties when they are requested to attend to them.
Another possibility is that participants might have been
alerted to the spatial nature of the experiment by com-
pleting the prescreening; however, we think this possibil-
ity is unlikely. Both the prescreening (which included
extra familiarity questions so as to avoid revealing the
experiment location) and main experiment were framed
to participants as an architectural study, and participants
were never informed of the prescreening selection cri-
teria. There was typically two weeks to a full month
between the prescreening and experiment. No partici-
pants in the incidental learning condition told the re-
searcher or revealed on the questionnaires that they
knew the experiment was about learning the spatial
layout of the environment. While it is possible that
participants were aware of the spatial nature of the
experiment, it is unlikely.
In the everyday context where no one tells you to
attend to spatial properties (i.e., incidental learning), it is
appealing to explain individual differences in maintain-
ing orientation and acquiring spatial knowledge as
resulting from people’s tendencies to focus on spatial
properties or not, rather than their abilities as such.
Such an explanation in the everyday context is plausible,
in our view. But in the context of a behavioral-science
experiment that randomly assigns participants to receive
incidental or intentional instructions, we find this ex-
planation to be much less plausible. Instead, we find it
more likely that at least most of the participants in our
two experimental groups differed substantially in their
tendency to pay attention to spatial properties, in ac-
cordance with the instructions they received, indicating
that differences in SOD do not merely reflect different
tendencies to focus on spatial properties.
Even if differences in people’s SOD are relatively auto-
matically expressed and not dependent on conscious
effort, it is important to emphasize that this does not
mean that environmental spatial skills cannot be im-
proved through training, including training to apply
particular learning strategies explicitly. Even innate traits
can be modified by experience. Variations in body mass
and hair color have unambiguously strong innate causes,
but diet, exercise, and hair dye prove that genetics (let
alone automaticity) is not destiny in any straightforward
way. Indeed, work such as that by Cornell, Heth, and
Rowat (1992) proves that environmental spatial know-
ledge can be improved by consciously applying learned
strategies of spatial orientation.
Our results provide further support for the validity of
self-reported SOD as a measure of spatial cognitive skills
in the environment (Hegarty et al., 2002; Sholl et al.,
2006). A novel result of our research is the substantial dif-
ferences we found between the SOD groups for landmarkfamiliarity and route knowledge. In previous work, SOD
differences are typically small or non-existent for mea-
sures of landmark and route knowledge (Ishikawa &
Montello, 2006). In fact, many studies of SOD do not as-
sess landmark or route knowledge (e.g., Cornell, Sorenson,
& Mio, 2003; Fields & Shelton, 2006; Hegarty et al., 2006;
Montello & Pick, 1993; Schinazi et al., 2013). This is prob-
ably done either because the researchers think it will
reveal no interesting relationships or because their experi-
mental designs require participants to have a certain min-
imal level of landmark and route knowledge in order to
assess survey knowledge. But the current research high-
lights that SOD differences can reveal themselves in less
sophisticated forms of spatial knowledge, and that re-
searchers should not assume that all participants have
equal levels of landmark and route knowledge after similar
exposure to an environment. It is likely that learning land-
mark identities and spatial relations along routes is simply
much easier, even if it is not strictly required as a precur-
sor for survey knowledge. In many studies, researchers
will encounter ceiling effects in the acquisition of these
types of knowledge and thus no relation to SOD. For ex-
ample, participants in the study by Ishikawa and Montello
(2006) completely accurately recalled and placed four
named landmarks in order, on each of two routes, and
even participants with poor SOD estimated the lengths of
route segments after only one learning trial with a correl-
ation of over 0.9 with the actual segment lengths. We also
note that in studies like Ishikawa and Montello, landmarks
are verbally labeled for participants, which may be less
challenging because it offloads some spatial processing
onto the verbal domain. This idea should be further
explored empirically.
Conclusions
By mimicking the experience of traveling to an unfamil-
iar destination while being led by someone familiar with
the environment and then needing to return home un-
aided, the current experiment investigated the relation-
ship between SOD and intentionality to learn the spatial
relationships within a novel neighborhood. Across nearly
all measures of spatial knowledge, individuals with a
good SOD acquired spatial knowledge significantly more
accurately than individuals with a poor SOD; whereas,
intentionality to learn showed nearly no accuracy differ-
ences in the spatial knowledge acquired. This suggests
that your SOD abilities are most predictive of your suc-
cess in returning home unaided, not your attention to
the spatial properties of the environment while traveling
to your destination. These results are consistent with the
idea that individual differences in environmental spatial
learning reflect implicit abilities that are expressed rela-
tively automatically. It does not necessarily suggest any-
thing about the source of these abilities, however. Our
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environmental spatial skills, as training programs or
other interventions could be effective in teaching indi-
viduals how to successfully implement spatial strategies,
but also, how to identify situations in which they need
spatial strategies. Paying attention to spatial features,
landmarks, and orientations is not the default mode for
individuals with a poor SOD, as the current research has
revealed; therefore, future work should investigate methods
that could assist poor SOD individuals with attending to
spatial features.
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